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THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND CORPORATE
DEMOCRACY
By Joel Seligman*
On April 28th of last year, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced it would begin a comprehensive re-examination
of the shareholders' role in corporate governance.' After receiving
* Assistant Professor, Northeastern Law School, Boston, Massachusetts. A.B., University of California (Los Angeles), 1971; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974. Mr. Seligman coauthored with Ralph Nader and Mark Green, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976), a
study of state and federal corporate laws.
1. Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 13482, (April 28, 1977) [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,130 p. 87889 entitled "Re-examination of
Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally." Therein the Commission explains
the background of its concern:
Recent disclosures concerning a wide variety of questionable and illegal corporate
practices, accomplished in certain instances with the knowledge and participation of
top corporate management, have served to focus public attention on the subject of
corporate accountability. A number of proposals designed to achieve a new "corporate
governance" have been suggested, including placing greater emphasis on the role of
outside directors and audit committees, increasing federal control over corporate conduct through legislation which requires federal chartering or setting of minimum standards of corporate conduct, and providing mechanisms to assure a higher level of
management accountability to shareholders through revisions of the Commission's
proxy rules.
The SEC, through its jurisdiction over proxy solicitations, has broad power under
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to promulgate proxy rules and regulations
which are "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." The Commission recognized that under the existing regulations shareholders often may not be provided adequate opportunities to participate meaningfully in
corporate governance or the corporate electoral process. Shareholders generally have
limited information relating to certain significant corporate policies and practices on
matters which are not submitted to shareholders for their approval; and, as a practical
matter, limited access to corporate proxy machinery. For the vast majority of shareholders, an election contest is not feasible because of the huge expenses involved.
Although shareholders may be permitted to make nominations from the floor at annual
meetings, it is clear that this right is of little practical value, since at that point proxies
have already been received by management, for nominees which it has chosen, and the
number of shareholders attending an annual meeting typically is insignificant. The
Commission believes that it is now appropriate to study these issues on a broader basis.
(footnotes deleted).
Id. at 87890-891.
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close to one hundred and fifty letters of comment,' the Commission
3
commenced hearings on September 29th in Washington D.C.
Few issues are so worthy of the Commission's concern. Under
state corporation law, shareholders have the power to nominate and
elect members of the board of directors. Today this power is virtually meaningless in publicly held corporations. The vast majority
of shareholders vote by proxy. But neither state nor federal law
guarantees shareholders access to the corporate proxy machinery.
Instead, incumbent management is allowed to use corporate funds
to solicit proxies on their own behalf while all other shareholders
must pay for proxy solicitations for their nominees out of their own
pockets. The result is that only incumbent mangagement can afford
to make nominations.
This is a very serious development for our competitive capitalistic economy. Both the market and shareholders lack an electoral
mechanism to replace incompetent, dishonest, or self-dealing directors with more diligent, honest, and loyal representatives. Since
electoral mechanisms generally can be expected to be swifter and
more certain than market pressures or tender offers, the most direct
2. Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 13901, (August 29, 1977) [197677 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 81296 p. 88461, 89463.
3. The hearings began on an unexpected note. Federal Trade Commission Chairman
Michael Pertschuk announced that the FTC has established a Task Force on Corporate
Accountability under the direction of the Office of Planning to explore such topics as: (1)
whether new remedies may be called for to combat certain patterns of behavior, e.g., the
appointment of special directors, or the creation of special duties of inspection and reporting;
(2) the extent to which the revolving door exchange of employees among government, industry, and professional firms has implications for competition and consumer protection; (3)
whether due process requirements of fairness should be extended to corporate relations with
customers and suppliers; (4) the effects which current standards for the selection, performance, and indemnification of directors may have on competition and consumer protection;
(5) whether to recommend federal chartering of certain types of corporations; (6) the extent
to which greater disclosure of audit data may be necessary if competition is to be fostered;
and (7) whether "social audits" of a company's behavior would promote greater fairness in
the market. Pertschuk explained:
I think a case can be made that leaving it to states to define the entire responsibility of corporations doesn't work. The interests of shareholders, customers, suppliers,
and the general public may be left unnecessarily at risk. Today, Federal Government
intervention is piecemeal and comes only in response to crises which should have been
avoided. We should be trying to prevent serious injuries to innocent parties instead of
pouring on tons of "cure". And the cry for regulatory reform fits right in there. The
Federal Government might be able to lighten its regulatory hand in areas where responsible corporate decision-making is endured. I think minimum Federal standards
could achieve this kind of restructuring.
Re-Examination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications and Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, begun August 27, 1977, Washington, D.C., PuBuc COMMENT Fuz No. S7-693.
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and effective stimulus to good corporate governance has been removed.
Under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Commission has the power to prescribe proxy rules and regulations
"as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 4 For the first time in its forty-three year history,
the Commission is seriously considering employing this authority to
promulgate proxy rules to protect shareholder rights in nominating
and electing directors; or alternatively, recommending to Congress
new federal legislation "such as a bill establishing minimum federal
standards of corporate conduct and shareholders' rights."' 5 This article describes current state and federal law affecting the election of
corporate boards of directors and suggests; first, a rule that the
Commission might issue under its section 14(a) authority; and, second, a broader legislative approach that the Commission might propose to Congress. The article concludes by arguing that the problems of corporate governance are sufficiently serious so that the
Commission's best approach would be to seek new legislation from
Congress.
I.

STATE CORPORATION LAW

Under state corporation law shareholders have exclusive power
to nominate and elect directors at a shareholders' meeting.' Usually
shareholder control is described in state statutes in a fairly elaborate
way. For example, section 211(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides that, "An annual meeting of stockholders shall
be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the manner provided in the by-laws." 7 Section 222
indicates that each shareholder shall receive written notice of the
place, date, and hour of the meeting not less than ten days nor more
than sixty days before the date of the meeting.8 Section 212 indicates that each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote for each
share of stock held by such shareholder;9 section 216 identifies the
quorum required at the meeting. 0 These statutory rules codify the
4. 15 U.S.C. § 14(a) (1970).
5. Release, supra note 2, at 88463.
6. See, e.g., DEL. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211(b) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 703(a)
(McKinney's 1963); ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 34 (1960); Eisenberg, Access to Proxy
Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1489 (1970).
7. DEL. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211(b) (1974).
8. DEL. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 222(b) (1974).
9. DEL. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 212(a) (1974).
10. DEL. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 216 (1974).

Published by eCommons, 1978

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

historic theory of corporate governance: the owners of a corporation
have the right to control its decision-making in the manner they
believe most likely to protect or enhance the value of their investment.
But few shareholders personally attend annual meetings. Sylvan Silver, a Reuters correspondent who covers over 100 Willmington annual meetings each year, described to me representative 1974
meetings: at Cities Service Company, the 77th largest corporation,
with some 135,000 shareholders, 25 shareholders personally attended the meeting; El Paso Natural Gas, with 125,000 shareholders, had 50 attendees; at Coca-Cola, the 69th largest corporation,
with 70,000 shareholders, 25 shareholders attended the annual
meeting; at Bristol Meyers, with 60,000 shareholders, a like 25
shareholders appeared. Even "Campaign GM," the most publicized
shareholder challenge of the past 20 years, was unable to attract
more than 3,000 of General Motors' 1,400,000 shareholders, or
roughly two-tenths of one percent." The vast majority of shareholders vote by signing and returning proxy cards.
State corporation law is largely silent on the mechanics of proxy
elections. As Professor Melvin Eisenberg has written, "By and large,
state corporate statutes do not even recognize the existence of proxy
solicitation, let alone regulate it.""2 But it is the near universal
practice in publicly held corporations for the board of directors or a
nominating committee or the corporate chief executive officer to
nominate a management slate and to use corporate funds and personnel to solicit proxies on its behalf. 3
Shareholder democracy has broken down because state courts
have allowed incumbent management to use corporate funds on
behalf of their candidates while requiring all other shareholders to
bear the costs of proxy solicitation for their nominees, with the slim
possibility of reimbursement if they win control of the board."
11. Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign GM, 69
L. REv. 419, 429 (1971).
12. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1492.
13. Id.; Caplin, ShareholderNominations Of Directors:A ProgramFor Fair Corporate
Suffrage, 39 VA. L. Rav. 141 (1953).
14. Leading modem decisions reflecting this rule include: Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F.
Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Locke Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D.
Conn. 1964); Braude v. Havenner, 38 Cal. App. 3d 526, 113 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1974); Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Super. Ct. Del. 1964); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight
Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (1934); Campbell v. Loews, 36 Del. Ch. 563,
134 A.2d 852 (1957); Lawyers Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Lighting and Refrigerating Co.,
187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y.
168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955); Cullom v. Simmonds, 139 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1955).
MICH.
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The states of New York and Delaware have extended the rule
even further. The leading decision in New York, Rosenfeld v.Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp.,15all but ruled that there were no
practical limits on how much management might spend to retain
control. As Judge Van Voorhis noted in dissent: "[Management's]
outlay included payment for all of the activities of a strenuous campaign to persuade and cajole in a hard-fought contest for control
of this corporation. It included, for example, expenses for entertainment, chartered airplanes and limosines, public relations
counsel and proxy solicitors."'"
A thorough description of permissible expenditures under current-state law is provided in Aranow and Einhorn's treatise, Proxy
Contests for Corporate Control.7 Items include: proxy solicitors
("The use of professional solicitors in large proxy contests has become almost normal."); 8 public relations experts; accountants; and
security analysts. Aranow and Einhorn additionally note:
In bitterly contested or close contests, managements of large corporations often use the services of their own employees. These services
have ranged all the way from performance of clerical anql ministerial
duties to public relations work and the solicitation of proxies. Efforts
have been made by insurgent groups to obtain a court order restraining the corporation from using employees for campaign purposes.'
But these efforts have been unsuccessful. Instead, as Louis Nizer
vividly described in his memoir 0 of the proxy contest which resulted
in the lawsuit known as Campbell v. Loews,2 ' large corporations
may mobilize thousands of employees on behalf of incumbent man22
agement's slate in a contested proxy election.
This practice has been wisely criticized as unfair. Professoi
Melvin Eisenberg has questioned whether the current practice is
even lawful under state law:
Is this practice lawful? While this question must be answered under
state law, neither statutes nor cases speak directly to the point. How15. 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
16. 309 N.Y. at 177; 128 N.E.2d at 295 (Van Voorhis dissenting). See also, Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Super. Ct. Del. 1964).
17.

E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, PRoxy CoNasmTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 556-64 (1968).

18. Id. at 557-58.
19. Id. at 563-64.
20. L. NIZER, My LIFE IN CouRT (1961).
21. 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957).
22. See a similar example in Aranow and Einhorn, supra note 17 at 270, involving an
unnamed "large national corporation" in which a substantial part of the sales force was
employed on a national scale to contact designated shareholders.
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ever, several important principles of corporate law each lead to the
conclusion that the shareholders are entitled to designate candidates
for directorships in any proxy card or proxy statement issued by the
corporation which lists candidates names. These principles are: That
the exclusive power to elect the board and the right to nominate
candidates for the board rests with the stockholders; that corporate
funds and facilities cannot be applied to the personal benefit of corporate officers; and that corporate assets cannot be applied to the bene23
fit of individual shareholders except in an evenhanded manner.
Mortimer Caplin concluded an often cited 1953 law review article:
[A]s presently employed-with the proxy machinery completely
dominated by the managers of industry, with the nominations for
directors being made by the managers themselves, and with the
shareholders being denied the opportunity of making independent
nominations in management's proxy statement-the proxy system of
voting has become an anti-democratic device, destructive of any real
system of checks and balances against possible managerial abuse,
and operating in contravention of our fundamental notions of fair
24
play.
More recently, Donald Petrie, an attorney, former partner in
Lazard Freres and Co., and former chairman of the executive committee of Avis, Inc., testified to the Senate Commerce Committee
on June 16, 1976:
The Congress in adopting the Federal Election Campaign Act of
.1971, as amended in 1974 and 1976, has gone far to set standards of
fairness, balance, and decency in the financing of elections to Federal
office.
By comparison, the present practice with respect to financing
corporate elections is neither fair, balanced nor decent: election expenses of incumbents are paid out of the corporate treasury; election
expenses of challengers must be advanced by the challengers themselves and may be recouped only if the challenge is successful.2 5
23. Eisenberg, supra note 6 at 1504. See generally, Id. at 1504-08.
24. Caplin, supra note 13, at 151.
25. Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., on "Corporate Rights and Responsibilities" Serial No. 94-95 at 113. See also F.
EMERSON AND F. LATCHAM, SHAxRHOLEa DEMocRAcy (1954); Note, FinancingProxy Contests
with CorporateFunds, 44 GEo. L.J. 303 (1956); L. Machtinger, Proxy Fight Expenditures of
Insurgent Shareholders, 19 CASE W.L. REv. 212 (1968); and Note, A Proposalfor the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in the CorporateProxy Statement, 74 COLuM. L.
REv. 1139 (1974).
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The cost of nominating a candidate for the board remains a
nearly insurmountable barrier to shareholder suffrage. A telephone
survey of several large public corporations found that the cost of
management's routine uncontested proxy solicitations for elections
to boards of directors presently ranges from $.41 per shareholder to
$3 per shareholder, not including substantial in-house costs such as
personnel and computer time. The following chart itemizes these
findings. All data were voluntarily supplied by officers of the named
corporations; in each instance the costs refer to the 1975 or 1976
annual proxy solicitation.
6
COST OF UNCONTESTED PROXY SOLICITATIONS2

Corporation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Proxy
Solicitation
Cost

Allegheny
Chrysler
Coca-Cola
Exxon
ITT
Marriott
Mobil
US Steel
Washington Post
Xerox

$ 12,000
$170,000
$ 46,300
$500,000
$250,000
$ 20,000
$158,000
$117,000
$ 6,000
$140,000

Number of
Shareholders

Cost Per
Shareholder

29,000
230,000
67,000
700,000
238,000
42,000
227,000
250,000
2,000
140,000

$ .41
$ .74
$ .69
$ .71
$1.05
$ .48
$ .69
$ .47
$3.00
$1.00

When there is a proxy contest, expenses are substantially
greater. For example, MGM which experienced a proxy fight for
control in 1967 reported management expenditures of $9.88 per
shareholder and opposition shareholder expenditures of $13.88 per
shareholder. The following chart shows expenses incurred by management and challengers in recent proxy contests. Again, the figures
are fragmentary; they do not include the imputed value of management's use of employee time.
High as the cost barrier to outside shareholder nomination of
candidates is, it is likely to increase as: (1) the number of shareholders in publicly held corporations increases; and (2) postage, printing, and other solicitation costs increase.
26. The data were collected by Robert Bildner and myself in May, 1976, when both of
us were working for Ralph Nader's Corporate Accountability Research Group in Washington
D.C. Certain corporations broke their costs down more specifically. For example, Exxon
indicated that its $500,000 expense included $80,000 for printing; $150,000 for mailing;
$120,000 for tabulation of votes and related costs; and $150,000 for broker's fees. ITT indicated that its costs might be somewhat larger than other corporations of a comparable size
since 18 percent of its shareholders were not United States citizens, necessitating higher
mailing costs.

Published by eCommons, 1978

[Vol. 3:1

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

=~

t-

mO

C11

t-7
4-

Ci

-4

t-:

-4

-41
-4
LO

C

-4

C

-4

CO

C.

co

co

LO

0D
0*

C

CID

-40
O
toc-

G-

C11
00o
C14 C4
00

-

w

COto
CO

1-4

00

-4

CO

4:5

4.

Co

to
to

LM
0

100

CO:

OO0

C11 CID

0rfl

COi

40

m

C13

cc

C11 r-

CD

0d
0>
1) u)

to

0

)
0

0

0
0

C>

tiCOz

r-

0 CO

1-t1

MLO

0

0

00
C)

.4-4

0)

05
0

1.

0
60

ca
as

LO
cts 4)

c C IS

v)

)
4) cd

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss1/2

ra

CL0

19781

CORPORATE DEMOCRACY

Already the cost barrier is virtually insurmountable. In 1974,
the Securities and Exchange Commission supervised the proxy solicitations of 6,615 corporations. 2s Management ran unopposed in
6,600 companies or 99.8 percent.29 In 6,606 companies, or 99.9 percent, management's entire slate was elected.3 These results were
consistent with those of the previous 18 years.3'
As the law stands today it is virtually impossible for a shareholder of a major U.S. corporation to make a board nomination
through a proxy solicitation. During 1973, for example, in the 500
largest industrial corporations, no incumbent management was
even challenged. Since these 500 corporations account for some 66
percent of the sales of all U.S. industrial corporations, the failure
of the corporate electoral machinery there alone would be a serious
matter. But, as the above data indicate, corporate board elections
rarely accord outside shareholders a chance to vote out incompetent, dishonest, or self-dealing directors in any of the more than
6,000 firms subject to the SEC's proxy regulations.
H.

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW

It was exactly this type of abuse that section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was intended to alleviate. As has often been
remarked, the purpose of section 14 is to restore "shareholder democracy. 32 Yet the present regulations do not directly affect elec28. 40th ANNUAL REPORT SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 33 (1974).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See chart at 10 infra.
32. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports on the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 explicitly state that the purpose of section 14 was to insure "fair corporate suffrage." In
the words of the House Commerce Committee Report:
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security
bought on a public exchange. Management. . .should not be permitted to perpetuate
themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies. . . .Inasmuch as only the exchanges
make it possible for securities to be widely distributed among the investing public, it
follows as a corrollary that the use of the exchanges should involve a corresponding
duty of according to shareholders fair suffrage. For this reason the proposed bill gives
the . . . Commission power to control the conditions under which proxies may be
solicited with a view 'to preventing the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the
free exercise of the voting rights of shareholders.
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 13; Accord, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 5 REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d.
Sess, 12, 77.
This purpose has consistently been recognized by the courts. As the United States Supreme Court stated in J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964): "[Section 14(a)] was
intended to control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to
preventing the recurrence of abuses which . . . [had] frustrated the free exercise of the
voting rights of stockholders." Accord, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970);
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tion of the board, which is the single most important aspect of
shareholder suffrage. Indeed, to my knowledge, and apparently that
of Professors Loss

3

and Eisenberg,'3 the last time the Commission

publicly discussed granting outside shareholders access to corporate
proxies to make board nominations was in 1943. Wartime SEC
SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948). "[Ilt
was the intent of Congress to require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage.
The control of great corporations by a very few persons was the abuse at which Congress
struck in enacting Section 14(a)." Id. at 518; Medical Comm'n for Human Rights v. SEC,
432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1971). "It is obvious to
the point of banality to restate the proposition that"Congress intended by its enactment of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to give true vitality to the concept of corporate
democracy." Id.; Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Initially the greatest obstacle to corporate suffrage was management secrecy. "Insiders
have at times solicited proxies without fairly informing the shareholders of the purposes for
which the proxies are to be used and have used such proxies to take from the shareholders
for their own selfish advantage valuable property rights." H.R. REP. No. 1383 supra at 13.
"Too often proxies are solicited without explanation of the real nature of the questions for
which authority to cast his vote is sought." S. REP. No. 792 supra at 74. See also, J.I. Case v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970);
Bernstein and Fisher, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on
Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 226, 228-29 (1940); Friedman, SEC Regulation of
Corporate Proxies, 63 HARV. L. REV. 796 (1950); Orrick, The Revised Proxy Rules of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 11 Bus. LAW. 32 (1956).
But there is near universal agreement that the Securities and Exchange Commission has
the power under section 14 to reach any abuse that threatens corporate suffrage and to
provide remedies "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." Professor Loss has explained: "The Commission's power under § 14(a) is not
necessarily limited to ensuring full disclosure. The statutory language is considerably more
general than it is under the specific disclosure philosophy of the 1933 Act." II L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 868 (2d. ed. 1961). From the breadth of section 14 other authorities
have concluded that the Commission both has the power and the duty to prescribe proxy rules
"as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
See,
e.g., Armstrong, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Proxy Contests of
Listed Companies, 11 Bus. LAW. 110, 111 (1955). "The breadth of the grant of authority can
hardly be questioned, considering the wording of the Exchange Act." Id.; Caplin, Shareholder
Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REV. 141, 155
(1953):
The . . .statutory standard, if not precise in its scope, certainly lends itself to
the interpretation that Congress intended to grant to the SEC the broadest of authority
in the control of proxy solicitation, a grant which would support the adoption by the
SEC of any reasonable regulatory provision and not simply provisions devoted to
securing the bare disclosure of information."
Id., Medical Comm'n for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1970) and SEC
v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947).
Indeed, the Commission has already recognized its power to prescribe a rule requiring
inclusion of shareholder nominees in the corporate proxy by circulating such a rule for comment in 1942. See text of rule and discussion in Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and
CorporateDemocracy, 37 VA. L. REV. 653, 682-85 (1951). Note his doubts about the Commission's power were quickly dispelled. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair CorporateSuffrage, 39 VA. L. REV. 141, 154-161 (1953).
33. Loss, supra note 32, at 901 n. 178.
34. Eisenberg, supra note 6 at 1502-03.
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Chairman Ganson Purcell testified to a House Subcommittee of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on June 9th. Purcell indicated that in August, 1942, the Commission's staff had
proposed a rule to permit "stockholders to use the management's
proxy statement to canvass stockholders generally for the election
of their own nominees for directorships."35 The Commission opposed
this rule.3 6 An accompanying memorandum described the proposal
and the Commission's objections. Any security holder could nominate directorial candidates, but management-on an equitable
basis-would only be required to include twice as many candidates
on the proxy as positions to be filled. According to the memorandum, there were no reasons to support this proposal. But, among
other objections, the Commission: (1) doubted it had authority to
change the proxy into a ballot; (2) feared unqualified persons might
be nominated; and, (3) doubted the equitable basis test would be
workable.

37

It is difficult to believe that the Commission took the issue
seriously. Congressman Winter asked Chairman Purcell if rules
then in effect, "just simply help management to stay in." Purcell
responded, "I doubt very much if they do."' In point of fact, it was
exactly because they did that section 14 was enacted. As prior SEC
Chairman William 0. Douglas had written, it was the conventional
wisdom that "the group that names the proxyholders controls the
board. "3
The first two of the Commission's three major objections seem
little more serious. The Commission already had transformed the
corporate proxy into a ballot by allowing shareholders to include
proposals for action in 1940.40 Of course, incompetent individuals
might be nominated. But the reality is that incumbent management's nominees often do not do a competent job." And the theory
of corporate law is plain that the shareholders' ownership gives them
the right to select directors. whom they believe are competent.2
35. Hearings on Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, at 19 (1943).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 157.
38. Id. at 70-71.
39. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1316 (1934).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1977).
41. See, e.g., M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); R. NADER, M. GREEN &
J.

SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 75-102 (1976).

42.

W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 150, 190-93 (4th ed. 1969); D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION
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The third Commission objection, however, endures as a substantial one: there are practical and "equitable" difficulties in designing a system of access to the corporate proxy that will insure
both (1) that outside shareholders have the opportunity to make
nominations; and (2) the proxy is not overloaded with so many
nominees that rational selection of directors becomes difficult.
But under section 14, it is the duty of the Commission to design
and supervise such a system where "necessary and appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors."' 3 In the administration of the rules for shareholder proposals for action, the Commission has shown the ability to create practical and fair rules that
resolve an analogous problem. That analogy suggests solutions to
each of the practical problems involved with allowing outside shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors in the corporation's
proxy.

III. A

PROPOSAL TO ALLOW OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS TO NOMINATE

CANDIDATES TO THE BOARD IN THE CORPORATION'S PROXY

As with the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 14a-8
respecting Proposals of Security Holders, a rule allowing outside
shareholders to nominate candidates to the board in the corporation's proxy must: (1) establish the rights of management; (2) establish the rights of other security holders; (3) delineate the form of
management and other security holders communications to all security holders; (4) establish funding rules; (5) establish the relation of
the new rule to the general rules respecting proxy solicitations; and
(6) establish the right of other security holders to timely access to
the corporation's shareholder list. A new rule might run along the
following lines.
(1) MANAGEMENT-Incumbent management, which
should be defined broadly to include all operating executives of the
corporation, outside attorneys, bankers, accountants, insurers, suppliers, distributors, et al. doing business with the firm, and all related "beneficial interests" as defined under section 16 of the 1934
Act, shall be allowed to nominate one candidate for each position
to be filled on the board of directors. Any incumbent director who
is not renominated by management may be renominated by another
security holder.
LAw

307-09 (1973); Mace supra note 41, at 6-7; R.
116 (1961).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 14(a) (1970).
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(2) OTHER SECURITY HOLDER-Any security holder or
security holder group owning .1 percent or $50,000 of the corporation's voting stock may nominate candidates to the board of directors in the corporation's proxy, but if the number of nominees made
by other security holders exceeds two for each position to be filled
the corporation shall only be required to include in its proxy two
nominees for each position to be filled and shall include the candidates nominated by a security holder or security holder group owning the greatest amount of the corporation's voting stock."
(3) CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS-The corporation
shall publish at its expense a campaign statement to accompany the
corporation's proxy. The statement shall list the qualifications of
each candidate for the board in no more than 100 words; his or her
nominator; and a statement by the candidate of up to 200 words
describing his or her reasons for seeking election.45
(4) CAMPAIGN FINANCE RULES-The corporation may
make no expenditures on behalf of any candidate or slate of candidates, nor may corporate employees be employed on behalf of any
candidate provided, however, that the corporation may employ corporate or other personnel to solicit votes for the single purpose of
insuring enough votes are cast to equal the corporation's quorum.
(5) PROXY SOLICITATION RULES-If outside shareholders are allowed to seek the support of other shareholders to form a
security holder group with a sufficient number of shares to insure
the presence of their nominees on the corporation's proxy, this process may be considered a "solicitation" within the meaning of the
SEC Proxy Rules. Such a construction would mean that the nominator would have to include a proxy statement with each request for
support pursuant to Rule 14a-3, comply with the filing requirements
of 14a-6, and adhere to the strictures against false and misleading
statements under 14a-9. These barriers to access to the corporation's
proxy would likely dissuade many potential nominations but would
also insure that few frivolous nominations occur. Whether or not
oral or written communications for the purpose of forming a security
holder group to make a nomination should be within the proxy
solicitation rules is a question the Commission will have to resolve
prior to issuing a proposed rule in terms of its assessment of (1) the
dangers of allowing outside shareholders to solicit support for nominees outside of these rules; (2) the added burdens to outside shareholders of complying with the rule; (3) the likelihood that merito44.
45.

See 74 COLUM. L. Rv. supra note 25, at 1157-61.
Id. at 1165.
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rious nominees will continue to be priced out of the proxy process;
and (4) the added cost to the Commission of enforcing the proxy
solicitation rules if they are extended to this process.
(6) SHAREHOLDER LISTS-Any proposed rule must guarantee outside shareholders timely access to the corporate shareholder list so that they will have the ability to select other shareholders with whom to correspond for the purpose of forming a security holder group.
A substantial case may be made for a rule of this sort. Previous
statements of the Commission indicate that it believes that it has
the power under section 14(a) to promulgate such a rule.46 Shareholders' investment in publicly held firms arguably will be worth
more if shareholders possess the power to replace-or at least challenge-incompetent, dishonest or disloyal directors. Similarly, the
overall economy will function more efficiently if such directors can
easily be replaced.
Implicitly, the SEC's enforcement actions against such firms as
Mattel 7 and Northrop 8 have paid homage to this principle. For
these cases have shown that the Commission itself believes that it
must seek replacement of certain directors and officers when they
commit illegal acts if present electoral mechanisms will not replace
them. Clearly the Commission's actions in these cases and its proposals to the New York Stock Exchange to increase the number of
outside directors on listed firms' boards show a recognition that new
mechanisms must be created to improve the competence, honesty
and loyalty of the board."
It is important also to realize how rarely electoral mechanisms
succeed today in uprooting incompetent, dishonest, or disloyal
directors and officers. In an article in The Nation, I outlined a series
of recent examples of poorly managed corporations-in none of
these companies did shareholders challenge the incumbent directors
through the proxy machinery.5 On August 24, 1975, The New York
Times showed that the overwhelming majority of executives convicted of campaign finance violations by the Watergate Special
Prosecutor were still on the job. 5' To this date none of these corporations' boards have been challenged through the proxy process.
46. Id. at 1155-56.
47. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,807 (1974).
48. Springer v. Jones Civ. No. 74-1455-F (D.C.C.D. Cal. 1975).
49. See letter dated May 11, 1976 from Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman
Roderick Hills to the New York Stock Exchange cited in Release, supra note 1, at 87891.
50. June 12, 1976 at 709.
51. August 24, 1975 § Ill at 1.
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A proxy rule of this sort would eliminate the pivotal weakness
in the current regimen of the law of corporate governance: the opportunity for incumbents to use corporate funds to outspend challengers who must initially bear all their own campaign costs. Although the proposed rule does not prohibit either side from spending
more than the other out of its own funds, it does insure that each
candidate will be adequately described to the shareholder electorate
and removes the opportunity for incumbents to use the corporate
treasury on behalf of their nominees.
Clearly this is consistent with the original intent of state corporation statutes. The purpose of the state corporate law of governance-that shareholder owners have the power to elect the corporation's board of directors-has been frustrated by state judicial decisions which allow incumbent management to spend nearly unlimited amounts of money on behalf of their own candidates. If the
Commission prescribed the proposed rule the original purpose of
state corporate law could be realized; the most important aspect of
corporate democracy could be restored.
It is preferable that the Commission rather than the states or
stock exchanges issue such a rule. Not only is it the duty of the
Commission to act under section 14, but there is ample reason to
doubt that any state will legislate such a rule. 5 It is also unlikely
that the stock exchanges will. 53 But even if a legislature or exchange
could be persuaded to issue such a rule, it would be preferable that
the Commission do so. Neither the states nor the exchanges could
reach all the large publicly held corporations that the Commission
can under its proxy rule-making authority. If only some states or
some exchanges instituted such a rule, these states or exchanges
could be evaded by corporations changing their state of domicile or
stock listing to less rigorous jurisdictions or exchanges.
To the objection that too many frivolous nominations might be
made, it can be argued that this is within the Commission's control.
It can design a rule-as it has done uncer Rule 14a-8-that creates
reasonable conditions for the employment of the proxy nomination
process. Above a series of such conditions have been suggested: (1)
a minimum of .1 percent or $50,000 of the voting stock must be
owned before the shareholder or shareholder group would have the
opportunity to nominate directors on the corporate proxy; (2) outsiders would be limited to two nominees for each position to be filled
on the board; and (3) seeking support for a nomination could be
52.
53.

See Nader, Green and Seligman, supra note 41, at 33-61.
See 74 COLUM. L. REv. supra note 25, at 1153-54.
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considered a proxy solicitation. These and similar procedures could
be employed to meet this objection.
What is not reasonable is for the Commission to allow outside
shareholders to be disenfranchised on the theoretical ground that
it cannot design a perfect or ideal voting procedure. Obviously, it
cannot. But it can design a procedure that is fairer than the current
autocratic practice of nearly every large corporation where only
incumbent management has the opportunity to make directorial
nominations.
Nor is the fear that the rule would favor rich outsiders realistic.
Under the proposed rule, management may use their own personal
funds to campaign. They may make telephone calls or write letters
on their own behalf after business hours. They may ask that sympathetic employees campaign on behalf of management's candidates
on their own time.
Management, also, will run as the "incumbents." Given the
historically cautious nature of shareholder voting, this advantage
alone may countervail any financial advantage of outsiders. Management will still have the opportunity to prepare the annual report
and the other practical advantages of being the incumbents.
But most importantly, no outsider, no matter how rich, can buy
votes. All he can do is advertise or hire proxy solicitors. Votes will
still be cast by rational thinking shareholders-many of whom, such
as bank trust department officers, are unlikely to be impressed by
the campaign budget of either side.
Both state corporation statutes and section 14 mandate that
democratic practice-whatever its risks-prevail. This is a wise policy. Shareholders, with their inherent caution, are likely consistently to back the incumbents unless they violate laws, perform
unprofitably, or in a self-interested fashion. It is exactly under those
circumstances that they should be uprooted.

IV. NEw

LEGISLATION

Alternatively, the Securities and Exchange Commission could
propose a broader legislative remedy." Arguably this is preferable.
54. I describe this legislative proposal in a more detailed form in Nader. Green and
Seligman, supra note 42, at 118-22. There seems little question that such a reform of corporate law would require a new federal statute. Under section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the Commission may require greater disclosure of financial or perhaps social
data without a new enactment; it may require corporations subject to its jurisdiction to list
opposing candidates in the corporation's proxy without a new enactment; but it is unlikely
that it may bar operating executives from making nominations to or serving on the board
without a new law. See chart at 10 supra.
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The modem corporation is akin to a political state in which all
powers are held by a single clique. The senior executives of a large
firm are essentially not accountable to other officials within the
firm. These are exactly the circumstances that in a democratic political state require a separation of powers into different branches of
authority. As James Madison explained in the FederalistNo. 47:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary,
in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny. Were the federal constitution, therefore,
really chargeable with this accumulation of power, or with a mixture
of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no
further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.55
A similar concern over the unaccountability of business executives historically led to the elevation of a board of directors to review
and check the actions of operating management. As a practical
matter, if corporate governance is to be reformed in a meaningful
way, the reforms should begin by restoring the board to its historical
role. The board should serve as an internal auditor of the corporation, responsible for constraining executive management from violations of law and breaches of trust. Like a rival branch of government, the board's function must be defined as separate from operating management. Rather than vaguely stating that directors should
"manage" the corporation-as current state corporations statutes
do-the board's role as disciplinarian should be clearly described.
For example, new legislation might require that a board of directors
establish and monitor procedures that assure that operating executives are informed of and obey applicable federal, state and local
laws. Or, the board might be required to approve or veto all fundamental operating executive business initiatives such as merger or
dividend decisions.
To accomplish such a redefinition of the board's role would
require the institutionalization of a new profession: the full-time
"professional" director. Corporate scholars frequently identify
William 0. Douglas' 1940 proposal for "salaried, professional experts [who] would bring a new responsibility and authority to
8
directorates and a new safety to stockholders"" as the origin of the
55.

See THE

56.

W.

FEDERALIST

62 (Cooke ed. 1964).
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professional director idea. More recently, corporations including
Westinghouse and Texas Instruments have established slots on
their boards to be filled by full-time directors.
To succeed, professional directors would need to put in the
substantial time necessary to perform an adequate job. One cannot
monitor the performance of a billion dollar corporation at a once-amonth meeting. The obvious minimum here is an adequate salary
to attract competent persons to work as full or near full time directors. The board would also need to be sufficiently staffed. A few
board members alone cannot oversee the activities of thousands of
executives. To be able to appraise operating executives, the board
would need a staff to help analyze complex business proposals, spotcheck accountability and frame pertinent inquiries. And the board
would need timely access to corporate data. To insure this, the
board should be empowered to nominate the corporate financial
auditor, select the corporation's counsel, compel the forwarding and
preservation of corporate records, require all corporate executives to
answer fully all board questions respecting corporate operations,
and, if necessary, dismiss any executive who fails to do so.
This proposed redesign of corporate management attempts to
make operating executives more accountable to law and their shareholders without diminishing operating efficiency. Like a judiciary
within the corporation, the board would have ultimate powers to
judge and sanction. Like a legislature, it would review executive
activity. Yet executives would retain their power to initiate and
administer business operations. The chief executive officer would
continue to have control over the organization of the executive hierarchy and the allocation of the corporate budget. The directors are
given ultimate control over a narrow jurisdiction: Does the corporation obey the law and protect the shareholders' investment? The
executive contingent retains general control over corporate operations.
No doubt there would be objections that this structure is too
expensive or that it will disturb the "harmony" of corporate management. But it is unclear there would be any increased cost in
adopting such a board. The true cost to the corporation could only
be determined by comparing the expense of a fully paid and staffed
board with the savings that might result from the elimination of
possible conflicts of interest or corporate inefficiency. It is true that
such a board would reduce the "harmony" of corporate management in the sense that the power of the chief executive or senior
executives would be subject to knowledgeable review. But a board
which monitors rather than rubber-stamps operating executives'
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decisions is exactly what is necessary to diminish the near unfettered power of corporate chief executives. Under normal circumstances there should be a healthy friction between operating executives and the board to assure that the wisest possible use is made
of corporate resources. When corporate executives are breaking the
law, there should be no "harmony" whatsoever.
V.

CONCLUSION

Testifying before the Securities Exchange Commission on the
first day of its current hearings on corporate governance, Senator
Howard Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Senate Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies Subcommittee, predicted "remedial
legislation in the not-too-distant future is very likely. . . . The
controversy is thus not over whether something should be done.
Everyone agrees that reform is necessary. .. . The real controversy is over how much should be done and-more importantlyhow should the reforms be implemented?"" 7
The first footnote of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
recent Release calling for a re-examination of corporate governance
perhaps is the best testament to the fact that the Commission is
aware that the need for a new pattern of shareholder suffrage may
have been established. That footnote states:
During the last two years, more than three hundred and fifty corporations have made disclosures, in public documents filed with the Commission, of a wide variety of questionable and illegal corporate practices including bribes, kickbacks, illegal political contributions, and
improper accounting practices. As noted in the "Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices," submitted to the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 12, 1976), "[tjhe almost universal characteristic of the cases reviewed by the Commission has been the apparent frustration of our system of corporate
accountability ..
"58
It is my belief that only if operating executives are barred from
nominating candidates to or serving on the board of directors can
the board perform its logical role as an internal auditor of the corporation. The greatest virtue of a fully independent board would be
its tendency to prevent inefficient or illegal transactions from ever
occuring. By removing operating executives from control of the
57. Testimony of Howard M. Metzenbaum before the Securities and Exchange
Commission, September 29, 1977.
58. Release, supra note 1, at 87890 n. 1.
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board that is supposed to review their actions, directors would be
able to ask tough questions without fear of offending fellow directors; they will be able to confirm operating executives' assertions of
fact and subject senior executives' business initiatives to independent scrutiny. At the very least, the Commission should amend its
proxy rules to permit outsiders to make competitive nominations to
the board when operating executives have failed to meet reasonable
standards of diligence and loyalty.
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